CLAT 2022 || New Pattern Legal Reasoning Quiz || 27.01.2022

An Act to protect the rights of married Muslim women and to prohibit divorce by pronouncing talaq by their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. This Act may be called the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. Short title, extent and commencement.

Both Houses of Parliament have passed a Bill making instant triple talaq a criminal offence, amidst persistent doubts whether it ought to be treated as a crime or just a civil case. It is true that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019, is a diluted version of the Bill as it was originally conceived. Earlier, it did not specify who could set the law in motion. Now the offence is cognizable only if the affected wife or one related to her by blood or marriage, files a police complaint. Thirdly, the offence is compoundable, that is, the parties may arrive at a compromise.

The government says its main objective is to give effect to the Supreme Court's 2017 verdict declaring instant triple talaq illegal. It claims that despite the court ruling, several instances have been reported. Making it an offence, the government says, will deter further resort to triple talaq, and provide redress for women in the form of a subsistence allowance and custody of children, besides getting the erring husband arrested.

In the light of the Supreme Court ruling on its validity, there is really no need to declare instant triple talaq a criminal offence. The practice has no approval in Islamic tenets, and is indeed considered abhorrent. Secondly, once it has been declared illegal, pronouncing talaq obviously does not have the effect of "instantaneous and irrevocable divorce" as this Bill claims in its definition of 'talaq'. The provisions that allow a woman to claim a subsistence allowance from the man and seek custody of her children can be implemented in the event of the husband abandoning her, even without the man's arrest. If triple talaq, in any form, is void, how the questions of children's custody and subsistence allowance arise while the marriage subsists, is not clear. And then, there is the practical question of how a man can provide a subsistence allowance while he is imprisoned. It has been argued by the Bill's proponents that dowry harassment and cruelty towards wives are treated as criminal offences even while the marriage subsists. It is a patently wrong comparison, as those acts involve violence and cruelty and are rightly treated as criminal offences. The same cannot be said of a man invoking a prohibited form of divorce.

As the triple talaq ordinance of 2018 was to expire on 22 January 2019 and also because The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2018 could not be passed, the government repromulgated the ordinance on 10 January 2019. On 12 January 2019, the president approved the 2019 ordinance.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indiacode.nic.in, www.livelaw.in, www.scconline.com.

An Act to protect the rights of married Muslim women and to prohibit divorce by pronouncing talaq by their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. This Act may be called the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. Short title, extent and commencement.

Both Houses of Parliament have passed a Bill making instant triple talaq a criminal offence, amidst persistent doubts whether it ought to be treated as a crime or just a civil case. It is true that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019, is a diluted version of the Bill as it was originally conceived. Earlier, it did not specify who could set the law in motion. Now the offence is cognizable only if the affected wife or one related to her by blood or marriage, files a police complaint. Thirdly, the offence is compoundable, that is, the parties may arrive at a compromise.

The government says its main objective is to give effect to the Supreme Court's 2017 verdict declaring instant triple talaq illegal. It claims that despite the court ruling, several instances have been reported. Making it an offence, the government says, will deter further resort to triple talaq, and provide redress for women in the form of a subsistence allowance and custody of children, besides getting the erring husband arrested.

In the light of the Supreme Court ruling on its validity, there is really no need to declare instant triple talaq a criminal offence. The practice has no approval in Islamic tenets, and is indeed considered abhorrent. Secondly, once it has been declared illegal, pronouncing talaq obviously does not have the effect of "instantaneous and irrevocable divorce" as this Bill claims in its definition of 'talaq'. The provisions that allow a woman to claim a subsistence allowance from the man and seek custody of her children can be implemented in the event of the husband abandoning her, even without the man's arrest. If triple talaq, in any form, is void, how the questions of children's custody and subsistence allowance arise while the marriage subsists, is not clear. And then, there is the practical question of how a man can provide a subsistence allowance while he is imprisoned. It has been argued by the Bill's proponents that dowry harassment and cruelty towards wives are treated as criminal offences even while the marriage subsists. It is a patently wrong comparison, as those acts involve violence and cruelty and are rightly treated as criminal offences. The same cannot be said of a man invoking a prohibited form of divorce.

As the triple talaq ordinance of 2018 was to expire on 22 January 2019 and also because The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2018 could not be passed, the government repromulgated the ordinance on 10 January 2019. On 12 January 2019, the president approved the 2019 ordinance.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indiacode.nic.in, www.livelaw.in, www.scconline.com.

An Act to protect the rights of married Muslim women and to prohibit divorce by pronouncing talaq by their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. This Act may be called the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. Short title, extent and commencement.

Both Houses of Parliament have passed a Bill making instant triple talaq a criminal offence, amidst persistent doubts whether it ought to be treated as a crime or just a civil case. It is true that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019, is a diluted version of the Bill as it was originally conceived. Earlier, it did not specify who could set the law in motion. Now the offence is cognizable only if the affected wife or one related to her by blood or marriage, files a police complaint. Thirdly, the offence is compoundable, that is, the parties may arrive at a compromise.

The government says its main objective is to give effect to the Supreme Court's 2017 verdict declaring instant triple talaq illegal. It claims that despite the court ruling, several instances have been reported. Making it an offence, the government says, will deter further resort to triple talaq, and provide redress for women in the form of a subsistence allowance and custody of children, besides getting the erring husband arrested.

In the light of the Supreme Court ruling on its validity, there is really no need to declare instant triple talaq a criminal offence. The practice has no approval in Islamic tenets, and is indeed considered abhorrent. Secondly, once it has been declared illegal, pronouncing talaq obviously does not have the effect of "instantaneous and irrevocable divorce" as this Bill claims in its definition of 'talaq'. The provisions that allow a woman to claim a subsistence allowance from the man and seek custody of her children can be implemented in the event of the husband abandoning her, even without the man's arrest. If triple talaq, in any form, is void, how the questions of children's custody and subsistence allowance arise while the marriage subsists, is not clear. And then, there is the practical question of how a man can provide a subsistence allowance while he is imprisoned. It has been argued by the Bill's proponents that dowry harassment and cruelty towards wives are treated as criminal offences even while the marriage subsists. It is a patently wrong comparison, as those acts involve violence and cruelty and are rightly treated as criminal offences. The same cannot be said of a man invoking a prohibited form of divorce.

As the triple talaq ordinance of 2018 was to expire on 22 January 2019 and also because The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2018 could not be passed, the government repromulgated the ordinance on 10 January 2019. On 12 January 2019, the president approved the 2019 ordinance.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indiacode.nic.in, www.livelaw.in, www.scconline.com.

An Act to protect the rights of married Muslim women and to prohibit divorce by pronouncing talaq by their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. This Act may be called the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. Short title, extent and commencement.

Both Houses of Parliament have passed a Bill making instant triple talaq a criminal offence, amidst persistent doubts whether it ought to be treated as a crime or just a civil case. It is true that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019, is a diluted version of the Bill as it was originally conceived. Earlier, it did not specify who could set the law in motion. Now the offence is cognizable only if the affected wife or one related to her by blood or marriage, files a police complaint. Thirdly, the offence is compoundable, that is, the parties may arrive at a compromise.

The government says its main objective is to give effect to the Supreme Court's 2017 verdict declaring instant triple talaq illegal. It claims that despite the court ruling, several instances have been reported. Making it an offence, the government says, will deter further resort to triple talaq, and provide redress for women in the form of a subsistence allowance and custody of children, besides getting the erring husband arrested.

In the light of the Supreme Court ruling on its validity, there is really no need to declare instant triple talaq a criminal offence. The practice has no approval in Islamic tenets, and is indeed considered abhorrent. Secondly, once it has been declared illegal, pronouncing talaq obviously does not have the effect of "instantaneous and irrevocable divorce" as this Bill claims in its definition of 'talaq'. The provisions that allow a woman to claim a subsistence allowance from the man and seek custody of her children can be implemented in the event of the husband abandoning her, even without the man's arrest. If triple talaq, in any form, is void, how the questions of children's custody and subsistence allowance arise while the marriage subsists, is not clear. And then, there is the practical question of how a man can provide a subsistence allowance while he is imprisoned. It has been argued by the Bill's proponents that dowry harassment and cruelty towards wives are treated as criminal offences even while the marriage subsists. It is a patently wrong comparison, as those acts involve violence and cruelty and are rightly treated as criminal offences. The same cannot be said of a man invoking a prohibited form of divorce.

As the triple talaq ordinance of 2018 was to expire on 22 January 2019 and also because The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2018 could not be passed, the government repromulgated the ordinance on 10 January 2019. On 12 January 2019, the president approved the 2019 ordinance.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indiacode.nic.in, www.livelaw.in, www.scconline.com.

An Act to protect the rights of married Muslim women and to prohibit divorce by pronouncing talaq by their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. This Act may be called the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. Short title, extent and commencement.

Both Houses of Parliament have passed a Bill making instant triple talaq a criminal offence, amidst persistent doubts whether it ought to be treated as a crime or just a civil case. It is true that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019, is a diluted version of the Bill as it was originally conceived. Earlier, it did not specify who could set the law in motion. Now the offence is cognizable only if the affected wife or one related to her by blood or marriage, files a police complaint. Thirdly, the offence is compoundable, that is, the parties may arrive at a compromise.

The government says its main objective is to give effect to the Supreme Court's 2017 verdict declaring instant triple talaq illegal. It claims that despite the court ruling, several instances have been reported. Making it an offence, the government says, will deter further resort to triple talaq, and provide redress for women in the form of a subsistence allowance and custody of children, besides getting the erring husband arrested.

In the light of the Supreme Court ruling on its validity, there is really no need to declare instant triple talaq a criminal offence. The practice has no approval in Islamic tenets, and is indeed considered abhorrent. Secondly, once it has been declared illegal, pronouncing talaq obviously does not have the effect of "instantaneous and irrevocable divorce" as this Bill claims in its definition of 'talaq'. The provisions that allow a woman to claim a subsistence allowance from the man and seek custody of her children can be implemented in the event of the husband abandoning her, even without the man's arrest. If triple talaq, in any form, is void, how the questions of children's custody and subsistence allowance arise while the marriage subsists, is not clear. And then, there is the practical question of how a man can provide a subsistence allowance while he is imprisoned. It has been argued by the Bill's proponents that dowry harassment and cruelty towards wives are treated as criminal offences even while the marriage subsists. It is a patently wrong comparison, as those acts involve violence and cruelty and are rightly treated as criminal offences. The same cannot be said of a man invoking a prohibited form of divorce.

As the triple talaq ordinance of 2018 was to expire on 22 January 2019 and also because The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2018 could not be passed, the government repromulgated the ordinance on 10 January 2019. On 12 January 2019, the president approved the 2019 ordinance.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indiacode.nic.in, www.livelaw.in, www.scconline.com.

The concept of Curative petition was evolved by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) where the question was whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the final judgement/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of a review petition. The Supreme Court in the said case held that in order to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice, it may reconsider its judgements in exercise of its inherent powers. For this purpose, the court has devised what has been termed as a "curative" petition. In the Curative petition, the petitioner is required to aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition filed earlier and that it was dismissed by circulation.

The Centre has filed an application in the Supreme Court for additional guidelines regarding the execution of condemned prisoners. The Ministry of Home Affairs seeks the incorporation of measures aimed at reducing the scope for death row convicts to adopt dilatory tactics. Even though there may be some evidence to believe that convicts tend to file review petitions, mercy petitions and curative petitions in such a way that their execution is indefinitely delayed, it is difficult to attribute their conduct to the supposedly "accused-centric" nature of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014). These guidelines were undoubtedly aimed at protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners in the context of a sound body of jurisprudence that maintains that such rights extend right up to the moment of their execution. The court was anxious about enforcing their right to be informed about the scope for filing petitions for clemency, for being given legal assistance in drafting them, and for exploring judicial remedies even after their appeals for mercy are rejected. Further, the 14-day time lag between the closure of the clemency route and their hanging is aimed at preventing secret executions.

It is strange that the government wants the Supreme Court to frame a rule imposing a seven-day limit on the time that convicts have to file a mercy petition after a death warrant is issued. And that courts, governments and prison authorities should all be mandated to issue death warrants within seven days of the rejection of mercy petitions and to carry out the sentence within seven days thereafter. On the need for a time limit for filing curative petitions, the government is right in believing that the absence of such a stipulation gives scope for convicts in the same case to take turns to file such petitions. However, there is no sign that the apex court delays disposal of curative petitions. If and when one is filed, it results in no more than a few days' delay. In a country that unfortunately retains the death penalty, there is no excuse for delaying the disposal of any petition, either in court, or before constitutional functionaries. Nor is there any need to expedite executions by revisiting sound guidelines. As the death penalty is limited to the "rarest of rare" cases, nothing is lost if those facing execution are allowed to exhaust all possible remedies.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indianexpress.com, www.indialegallive.com.

The concept of Curative petition was evolved by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) where the question was whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the final judgement/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of a review petition. The Supreme Court in the said case held that in order to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice, it may reconsider its judgements in exercise of its inherent powers. For this purpose, the court has devised what has been termed as a "curative" petition. In the Curative petition, the petitioner is required to aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition filed earlier and that it was dismissed by circulation.

The Centre has filed an application in the Supreme Court for additional guidelines regarding the execution of condemned prisoners. The Ministry of Home Affairs seeks the incorporation of measures aimed at reducing the scope for death row convicts to adopt dilatory tactics. Even though there may be some evidence to believe that convicts tend to file review petitions, mercy petitions and curative petitions in such a way that their execution is indefinitely delayed, it is difficult to attribute their conduct to the supposedly "accused-centric" nature of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014). These guidelines were undoubtedly aimed at protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners in the context of a sound body of jurisprudence that maintains that such rights extend right up to the moment of their execution. The court was anxious about enforcing their right to be informed about the scope for filing petitions for clemency, for being given legal assistance in drafting them, and for exploring judicial remedies even after their appeals for mercy are rejected. Further, the 14-day time lag between the closure of the clemency route and their hanging is aimed at preventing secret executions.

It is strange that the government wants the Supreme Court to frame a rule imposing a seven-day limit on the time that convicts have to file a mercy petition after a death warrant is issued. And that courts, governments and prison authorities should all be mandated to issue death warrants within seven days of the rejection of mercy petitions and to carry out the sentence within seven days thereafter. On the need for a time limit for filing curative petitions, the government is right in believing that the absence of such a stipulation gives scope for convicts in the same case to take turns to file such petitions. However, there is no sign that the apex court delays disposal of curative petitions. If and when one is filed, it results in no more than a few days' delay. In a country that unfortunately retains the death penalty, there is no excuse for delaying the disposal of any petition, either in court, or before constitutional functionaries. Nor is there any need to expedite executions by revisiting sound guidelines. As the death penalty is limited to the "rarest of rare" cases, nothing is lost if those facing execution are allowed to exhaust all possible remedies.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indianexpress.com, www.indialegallive.com.

The concept of Curative petition was evolved by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) where the question was whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the final judgement/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of a review petition. The Supreme Court in the said case held that in order to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice, it may reconsider its judgements in exercise of its inherent powers. For this purpose, the court has devised what has been termed as a "curative" petition. In the Curative petition, the petitioner is required to aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition filed earlier and that it was dismissed by circulation.

The Centre has filed an application in the Supreme Court for additional guidelines regarding the execution of condemned prisoners. The Ministry of Home Affairs seeks the incorporation of measures aimed at reducing the scope for death row convicts to adopt dilatory tactics. Even though there may be some evidence to believe that convicts tend to file review petitions, mercy petitions and curative petitions in such a way that their execution is indefinitely delayed, it is difficult to attribute their conduct to the supposedly "accused-centric" nature of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014). These guidelines were undoubtedly aimed at protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners in the context of a sound body of jurisprudence that maintains that such rights extend right up to the moment of their execution. The court was anxious about enforcing their right to be informed about the scope for filing petitions for clemency, for being given legal assistance in drafting them, and for exploring judicial remedies even after their appeals for mercy are rejected. Further, the 14-day time lag between the closure of the clemency route and their hanging is aimed at preventing secret executions.

It is strange that the government wants the Supreme Court to frame a rule imposing a seven-day limit on the time that convicts have to file a mercy petition after a death warrant is issued. And that courts, governments and prison authorities should all be mandated to issue death warrants within seven days of the rejection of mercy petitions and to carry out the sentence within seven days thereafter. On the need for a time limit for filing curative petitions, the government is right in believing that the absence of such a stipulation gives scope for convicts in the same case to take turns to file such petitions. However, there is no sign that the apex court delays disposal of curative petitions. If and when one is filed, it results in no more than a few days' delay. In a country that unfortunately retains the death penalty, there is no excuse for delaying the disposal of any petition, either in court, or before constitutional functionaries. Nor is there any need to expedite executions by revisiting sound guidelines. As the death penalty is limited to the "rarest of rare" cases, nothing is lost if those facing execution are allowed to exhaust all possible remedies.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indianexpress.com, www.indialegallive.com.

The concept of Curative petition was evolved by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) where the question was whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the final judgement/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of a review petition. The Supreme Court in the said case held that in order to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice, it may reconsider its judgements in exercise of its inherent powers. For this purpose, the court has devised what has been termed as a "curative" petition. In the Curative petition, the petitioner is required to aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition filed earlier and that it was dismissed by circulation.

The Centre has filed an application in the Supreme Court for additional guidelines regarding the execution of condemned prisoners. The Ministry of Home Affairs seeks the incorporation of measures aimed at reducing the scope for death row convicts to adopt dilatory tactics. Even though there may be some evidence to believe that convicts tend to file review petitions, mercy petitions and curative petitions in such a way that their execution is indefinitely delayed, it is difficult to attribute their conduct to the supposedly "accused-centric" nature of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014). These guidelines were undoubtedly aimed at protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners in the context of a sound body of jurisprudence that maintains that such rights extend right up to the moment of their execution. The court was anxious about enforcing their right to be informed about the scope for filing petitions for clemency, for being given legal assistance in drafting them, and for exploring judicial remedies even after their appeals for mercy are rejected. Further, the 14-day time lag between the closure of the clemency route and their hanging is aimed at preventing secret executions.

It is strange that the government wants the Supreme Court to frame a rule imposing a seven-day limit on the time that convicts have to file a mercy petition after a death warrant is issued. And that courts, governments and prison authorities should all be mandated to issue death warrants within seven days of the rejection of mercy petitions and to carry out the sentence within seven days thereafter. On the need for a time limit for filing curative petitions, the government is right in believing that the absence of such a stipulation gives scope for convicts in the same case to take turns to file such petitions. However, there is no sign that the apex court delays disposal of curative petitions. If and when one is filed, it results in no more than a few days' delay. In a country that unfortunately retains the death penalty, there is no excuse for delaying the disposal of any petition, either in court, or before constitutional functionaries. Nor is there any need to expedite executions by revisiting sound guidelines. As the death penalty is limited to the "rarest of rare" cases, nothing is lost if those facing execution are allowed to exhaust all possible remedies.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indianexpress.com, www.indialegallive.com.

The concept of Curative petition was evolved by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) where the question was whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the final judgement/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of a review petition. The Supreme Court in the said case held that in order to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice, it may reconsider its judgements in exercise of its inherent powers. For this purpose, the court has devised what has been termed as a "curative" petition. In the Curative petition, the petitioner is required to aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition filed earlier and that it was dismissed by circulation.

The Centre has filed an application in the Supreme Court for additional guidelines regarding the execution of condemned prisoners. The Ministry of Home Affairs seeks the incorporation of measures aimed at reducing the scope for death row convicts to adopt dilatory tactics. Even though there may be some evidence to believe that convicts tend to file review petitions, mercy petitions and curative petitions in such a way that their execution is indefinitely delayed, it is difficult to attribute their conduct to the supposedly "accused-centric" nature of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014). These guidelines were undoubtedly aimed at protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners in the context of a sound body of jurisprudence that maintains that such rights extend right up to the moment of their execution. The court was anxious about enforcing their right to be informed about the scope for filing petitions for clemency, for being given legal assistance in drafting them, and for exploring judicial remedies even after their appeals for mercy are rejected. Further, the 14-day time lag between the closure of the clemency route and their hanging is aimed at preventing secret executions.

It is strange that the government wants the Supreme Court to frame a rule imposing a seven-day limit on the time that convicts have to file a mercy petition after a death warrant is issued. And that courts, governments and prison authorities should all be mandated to issue death warrants within seven days of the rejection of mercy petitions and to carry out the sentence within seven days thereafter. On the need for a time limit for filing curative petitions, the government is right in believing that the absence of such a stipulation gives scope for convicts in the same case to take turns to file such petitions. However, there is no sign that the apex court delays disposal of curative petitions. If and when one is filed, it results in no more than a few days' delay. In a country that unfortunately retains the death penalty, there is no excuse for delaying the disposal of any petition, either in court, or before constitutional functionaries. Nor is there any need to expedite executions by revisiting sound guidelines. As the death penalty is limited to the "rarest of rare" cases, nothing is lost if those facing execution are allowed to exhaust all possible remedies.

Sources: (Extracted and recreated): www.indianexpress.com, www.indialegallive.com.