CLAT 2022 || New Pattern Legal Reasoning Quiz || 24.09.2021 for CLAT UG Exams

Question 1

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

The Supreme Court on March 17, 2020 granted eligibility for grant of permanent commission for women officers in the Navy, saying “women can sail with same efficiency as male officers and there should be no discrimination.” The application for permanent commission will be considered based on the availability of vacancies and the recommendations of the chief of naval staff, the Court has said.

A permanent commission entitles an officer to serve in the Navy till he/she retires, unlike short service commission (“SSC”), which is currently for 10 years and can be extended by four more years, or a total of 14 years.

A division bench of justices DY Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi said denying permanent commission for women amounts to miscarriage of justice.

It said there cannot be gender discrimination in granting permanent commission to women officers in the Navy after the statutory bar was lifted by the Centre in 1992 to allow entry of women in the Navy.

“Once statutory bar was lifted to allow entry of women officers then male and female officers are to be treated equally in granting permanent commission,” the court said.

The bench rejected the Centre’s stand that women officers in Navy can’t be granted sea duties because its Russian vessels don’t have washrooms for them. There is enough documentary evidence to suggest women officers in Navy brought accolades to the force, it said.

The verdict also grants pension benefits to women officers in the Navy who have retired prior to the date of the judgment, and were not granted permanent commission, while clarifying that pension benefits would not be available to officers who retired after the date of the decision and who had not opted for permanent commission.

Sub Lieutenant Arora is a woman officer in the Indian Navy; she, along with Sub Lieutenant Singh, a male officer, have served the same duration in the Navy, and both apply for a permanent commission (“PC”). At the time of considering their applications, the chief of naval staff orders that Sub Lieutenant Singh would be granted a PC, but not Sub Lieutenant Arora, since, he says, “Women do not have the physical capability to serve on the high seas and should not be away from their family for such long durations.” In light of the Supreme Court’s judgment described in the passage above, is such an order valid?

Question 2

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

The Supreme Court on March 17, 2020 granted eligibility for grant of permanent commission for women officers in the Navy, saying “women can sail with same efficiency as male officers and there should be no discrimination.” The application for permanent commission will be considered based on the availability of vacancies and the recommendations of the chief of naval staff, the Court has said.

A permanent commission entitles an officer to serve in the Navy till he/she retires, unlike short service commission (“SSC”), which is currently for 10 years and can be extended by four more years, or a total of 14 years.

A division bench of justices DY Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi said denying permanent commission for women amounts to miscarriage of justice.

It said there cannot be gender discrimination in granting permanent commission to women officers in the Navy after the statutory bar was lifted by the Centre in 1992 to allow entry of women in the Navy.

“Once statutory bar was lifted to allow entry of women officers then male and female officers are to be treated equally in granting permanent commission,” the court said.

The bench rejected the Centre’s stand that women officers in Navy can’t be granted sea duties because its Russian vessels don’t have washrooms for them. There is enough documentary evidence to suggest women officers in Navy brought accolades to the force, it said.

The verdict also grants pension benefits to women officers in the Navy who have retired prior to the date of the judgment, and were not granted permanent commission, while clarifying that pension benefits would not be available to officers who retired after the date of the decision and who had not opted for permanent commission.

Two officers in the Navy, one male and one female, were being considered for the grant of PC on March 20, 2020. Since there was, at that time, only one PC slot available in the Navy’s quota, the supervising officer had to determine which of the two officers should be granted PC. After considering all the information at hand, the chief of naval staff noted that the male officer had an impeccable service record, whereas the female officer had received certain adverse remarks for her handling of her responsibilities in the past, and had not performed as well as the male officer. The chief of naval staff therefore decides to recommend the PC to the male officer, but not to the female officer. The female officer claims this is violative of the Supreme Court judgment. Is she right?

Question 3

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

The Supreme Court on March 17, 2020 granted eligibility for grant of permanent commission for women officers in the Navy, saying “women can sail with same efficiency as male officers and there should be no discrimination.” The application for permanent commission will be considered based on the availability of vacancies and the recommendations of the chief of naval staff, the Court has said.

A permanent commission entitles an officer to serve in the Navy till he/she retires, unlike short service commission (“SSC”), which is currently for 10 years and can be extended by four more years, or a total of 14 years.

A division bench of justices DY Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi said denying permanent commission for women amounts to miscarriage of justice.

It said there cannot be gender discrimination in granting permanent commission to women officers in the Navy after the statutory bar was lifted by the Centre in 1992 to allow entry of women in the Navy.

“Once statutory bar was lifted to allow entry of women officers then male and female officers are to be treated equally in granting permanent commission,” the court said.

The bench rejected the Centre’s stand that women officers in Navy can’t be granted sea duties because its Russian vessels don’t have washrooms for them. There is enough documentary evidence to suggest women officers in Navy brought accolades to the force, it said.

The verdict also grants pension benefits to women officers in the Navy who have retired prior to the date of the judgment, and were not granted permanent commission, while clarifying that pension benefits would not be available to officers who retired after the date of the decision and who had not opted for permanent commission.

Lt. Cdr. Khanna has been serving in the Indian Navy on SSC since January 1, 2010. She has decided not to opt for PC. Until what date, at the maximum, can Lt. Cdr. Khanna serve as an officer in the Navy?

Question 4

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

The Supreme Court on March 17, 2020 granted eligibility for grant of permanent commission for women officers in the Navy, saying “women can sail with same efficiency as male officers and there should be no discrimination.” The application for permanent commission will be considered based on the availability of vacancies and the recommendations of the chief of naval staff, the Court has said.

A permanent commission entitles an officer to serve in the Navy till he/she retires, unlike short service commission (“SSC”), which is currently for 10 years and can be extended by four more years, or a total of 14 years.

A division bench of justices DY Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi said denying permanent commission for women amounts to miscarriage of justice.

It said there cannot be gender discrimination in granting permanent commission to women officers in the Navy after the statutory bar was lifted by the Centre in 1992 to allow entry of women in the Navy.

“Once statutory bar was lifted to allow entry of women officers then male and female officers are to be treated equally in granting permanent commission,” the court said.

The bench rejected the Centre’s stand that women officers in Navy can’t be granted sea duties because its Russian vessels don’t have washrooms for them. There is enough documentary evidence to suggest women officers in Navy brought accolades to the force, it said.

The verdict also grants pension benefits to women officers in the Navy who have retired prior to the date of the judgment, and were not granted permanent commission, while clarifying that pension benefits would not be available to officers who retired after the date of the decision and who had not opted for permanent commission.

Vice Admiral Joshi retired from the Indian Navy on March 22, 2020 with a distinguished service record over the course of her SSC . She had decided not to opt for PC, and had thus retired at the end of her 14-year stint as an SSC officer in the Navy. Is Vice Admiral Joshi eligible for pension after retirement?

Question 5

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

The Supreme Court on March 17, 2020 granted eligibility for grant of permanent commission for women officers in the Navy, saying “women can sail with same efficiency as male officers and there should be no discrimination.” The application for permanent commission will be considered based on the availability of vacancies and the recommendations of the chief of naval staff, the Court has said.

A permanent commission entitles an officer to serve in the Navy till he/she retires, unlike short service commission (“SSC”), which is currently for 10 years and can be extended by four more years, or a total of 14 years.

A division bench of justices DY Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi said denying permanent commission for women amounts to miscarriage of justice.

It said there cannot be gender discrimination in granting permanent commission to women officers in the Navy after the statutory bar was lifted by the Centre in 1992 to allow entry of women in the Navy.

“Once statutory bar was lifted to allow entry of women officers then male and female officers are to be treated equally in granting permanent commission,” the court said.

The bench rejected the Centre’s stand that women officers in Navy can’t be granted sea duties because its Russian vessels don’t have washrooms for them. There is enough documentary evidence to suggest women officers in Navy brought accolades to the force, it said.

The verdict also grants pension benefits to women officers in the Navy who have retired prior to the date of the judgment, and were not granted permanent commission, while clarifying that pension benefits would not be available to officers who retired after the date of the decision and who had not opted for permanent commission.

Lt. Gupta, a woman officer serving in the Indian Navy since March 1, 2014, applied for and was granted PC on March 25, 2020. Until what date at the maximum can she serve as an officer in the Navy?

Question 6

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

There is a popular myth, often fostered by the police itself, that the force requires ‘orders’ from their superiors, i.e. the political executive, in order to ‘act’. In reality, under the law, the police have adequate powers and they do not need any orders from anybody, provided they are ‘aware’ of their powers and have the will to act. A second myth relates to the use of lethal force. The popular notion is that the police need special orders to open fire. Once again, it is not so.

An unlawful assembly (popularly known as a mob or a riotous mob) has been defined in the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) in Section 141 as “An assembly of five or more persons, where the common object of the persons composing that assembly is committing violence or where such assembly of five or more persons is likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace”.

How exactly the legal power of the police to use force, vested in Section 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”), is to be used was prescribed in the case of Karam Singh v. Hardayal Singh And Ors. It was held that before any force can be used, three prerequisites are to be satisfied. Firstly, there should be an unlawful assembly. Secondly, such assembly is ordered to be dispersed, and thirdly, in spite of such orders to disperse, the assembly should have refused to disperse. Thus, the police can never have any excuse for not acting or waiting for orders from their superiors or the political executive.

It is a popular misconception that the police need an order from a magistrate in order to act. Section 129 of the CrPC speaks of ‘Any executive magistrate or officer in charge of a police station or, in the absence of such officer in charge, any police officer, not below the rank of a sub-inspector’. This means that any one of them can order the use of force to disperse an unlawful assembly. One often finds police officers taking a plea that while they wanted to use force, the executive magistrate did not issue orders even though the law does not say that only an executive magistrate can issue such an order. If there is an executive magistrate around, it is generally considered good practice to obtain her or his orders, but it is not stated anywhere that it is mandatory.

Inspector Ishmeet is in charge of a team of five constables of the police entrusted with capturing the notorious gangster Varun Mouli, who has been on the run from the police for some time. He receives information that Mouli is hiding in a remote suburb of Mumbai, and decides to take the local train to reach Mouli as soon as possible. The Inspector and his team reach Dadar station to catch the train, but when they reach there, the platform is extremely crowded, and they are not able to get through to the train. Inspector Ishmeet shouts loudly at the people on the platform, telling them to get out of the way, but nobody listens to him, as it is rush hour, and the people were keen to get to their workplace. Inspector Ishmeet opened fire to disperse the crowd. When he is pulled up the authorities for doing so, he pleads that he was merely exercising his powers under S. 129 of the CrPC. Is his argument valid? (An inspector ranks above a sub-inspector of police; a constable ranks below a sub-inspector of police.)

Question 7

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

There is a popular myth, often fostered by the police itself, that the force requires ‘orders’ from their superiors, i.e. the political executive, in order to ‘act’. In reality, under the law, the police have adequate powers and they do not need any orders from anybody, provided they are ‘aware’ of their powers and have the will to act. A second myth relates to the use of lethal force. The popular notion is that the police need special orders to open fire. Once again, it is not so.

An unlawful assembly (popularly known as a mob or a riotous mob) has been defined in the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) in Section 141 as “An assembly of five or more persons, where the common object of the persons composing that assembly is committing violence or where such assembly of five or more persons is likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace”.

How exactly the legal power of the police to use force, vested in Section 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”), is to be used was prescribed in the case of Karam Singh v. Hardayal Singh And Ors. It was held that before any force can be used, three prerequisites are to be satisfied. Firstly, there should be an unlawful assembly. Secondly, such assembly is ordered to be dispersed, and thirdly, in spite of such orders to disperse, the assembly should have refused to disperse. Thus, the police can never have any excuse for not acting or waiting for orders from their superiors or the political executive.

It is a popular misconception that the police need an order from a magistrate in order to act. Section 129 of the CrPC speaks of ‘Any executive magistrate or officer in charge of a police station or, in the absence of such officer in charge, any police officer, not below the rank of a sub-inspector’. This means that any one of them can order the use of force to disperse an unlawful assembly. One often finds police officers taking a plea that while they wanted to use force, the executive magistrate did not issue orders even though the law does not say that only an executive magistrate can issue such an order. If there is an executive magistrate around, it is generally considered good practice to obtain her or his orders, but it is not stated anywhere that it is mandatory.

Inspector Ishmeet and his team finally reach the location where Mouli is hiding, a park in a remote suburb. There, they find Mouli talking to two of his associates, and overhear them planning to rob a nearby bank. Inspector Ishmeet shouts out to Mouli and his associates, telling them to “Stand still” and “Do not move!”. Mouli and his associates instead start running away from the spot, and Inspector Ishmeet and his team chase them down and start hitting them with lathis (wooden sticks). Once again, Inspector Ishmeet claims that this was a valid exercise of his power under S. 129 of the CrPC. Which of the following are reasons why this was not a valid exercise of the Inspector’s powers under S. 129 of the CrPC?

Question 8

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

There is a popular myth, often fostered by the police itself, that the force requires ‘orders’ from their superiors, i.e. the political executive, in order to ‘act’. In reality, under the law, the police have adequate powers and they do not need any orders from anybody, provided they are ‘aware’ of their powers and have the will to act. A second myth relates to the use of lethal force. The popular notion is that the police need special orders to open fire. Once again, it is not so.

An unlawful assembly (popularly known as a mob or a riotous mob) has been defined in the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) in Section 141 as “An assembly of five or more persons, where the common object of the persons composing that assembly is committing violence or where such assembly of five or more persons is likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace”.

How exactly the legal power of the police to use force, vested in Section 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”), is to be used was prescribed in the case of Karam Singh v. Hardayal Singh And Ors. It was held that before any force can be used, three prerequisites are to be satisfied. Firstly, there should be an unlawful assembly. Secondly, such assembly is ordered to be dispersed, and thirdly, in spite of such orders to disperse, the assembly should have refused to disperse. Thus, the police can never have any excuse for not acting or waiting for orders from their superiors or the political executive.

It is a popular misconception that the police need an order from a magistrate in order to act. Section 129 of the CrPC speaks of ‘Any executive magistrate or officer in charge of a police station or, in the absence of such officer in charge, any police officer, not below the rank of a sub-inspector’. This means that any one of them can order the use of force to disperse an unlawful assembly. One often finds police officers taking a plea that while they wanted to use force, the executive magistrate did not issue orders even though the law does not say that only an executive magistrate can issue such an order. If there is an executive magistrate around, it is generally considered good practice to obtain her or his orders, but it is not stated anywhere that it is mandatory.

Mouli and his associates ran away from the spot, and when Inspector Ishmeet’s team finally caught up with them, five more of Mouli’s associates had joined Mouli. The eight of them were standing outside a local bank, armed with sticks and stones, and were breaking all the windows in the bank in an attempt to scare people and raid the bank. As Inspector Ishmeet was tired from chasing Mouli and his group and had stopped somewhere to rest, Head Constable Kumar was leading the police team, and he ordered the team to start firing upon Mouli’s group to stop them. Did he have the authority to do so?

Question 9

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

There is a popular myth, often fostered by the police itself, that the force requires ‘orders’ from their superiors, i.e. the political executive, in order to ‘act’. In reality, under the law, the police have adequate powers and they do not need any orders from anybody, provided they are ‘aware’ of their powers and have the will to act. A second myth relates to the use of lethal force. The popular notion is that the police need special orders to open fire. Once again, it is not so.

An unlawful assembly (popularly known as a mob or a riotous mob) has been defined in the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) in Section 141 as “An assembly of five or more persons, where the common object of the persons composing that assembly is committing violence or where such assembly of five or more persons is likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace”.

How exactly the legal power of the police to use force, vested in Section 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”), is to be used was prescribed in the case of Karam Singh v. Hardayal Singh And Ors. It was held that before any force can be used, three prerequisites are to be satisfied. Firstly, there should be an unlawful assembly. Secondly, such assembly is ordered to be dispersed, and thirdly, in spite of such orders to disperse, the assembly should have refused to disperse. Thus, the police can never have any excuse for not acting or waiting for orders from their superiors or the political executive.

It is a popular misconception that the police need an order from a magistrate in order to act. Section 129 of the CrPC speaks of ‘Any executive magistrate or officer in charge of a police station or, in the absence of such officer in charge, any police officer, not below the rank of a sub-inspector’. This means that any one of them can order the use of force to disperse an unlawful assembly. One often finds police officers taking a plea that while they wanted to use force, the executive magistrate did not issue orders even though the law does not say that only an executive magistrate can issue such an order. If there is an executive magistrate around, it is generally considered good practice to obtain her or his orders, but it is not stated anywhere that it is mandatory.

Inspector Ishmeet finally caught up with this team, and managed to stop them just before they opened fire on Mouli and his associates. He then shouted at Mouli and his group to disperse, and when they did not, he tried to call up the local executive magistrate, to obtain her order to use force on Mouli and his associates. Was it necessary for him to obtain the executive magistrate’s orders in that situation?

Question 10

Direction: Each set of questions in this section is based on the reasoning and arguments, or facts and principles set out in the preceding passage. Some of these principles may not be true in the real or legal sense, yet you must conclusively assume that they are true for the purposes of this Section. Please answer each question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the corresponding passage. Do not rely on any principle of law other than the ones supplied to you, and do not assume any facts other than those supplied to you when answering the questions.

Passage

There is a popular myth, often fostered by the police itself, that the force requires ‘orders’ from their superiors, i.e. the political executive, in order to ‘act’. In reality, under the law, the police have adequate powers and they do not need any orders from anybody, provided they are ‘aware’ of their powers and have the will to act. A second myth relates to the use of lethal force. The popular notion is that the police need special orders to open fire. Once again, it is not so.

An unlawful assembly (popularly known as a mob or a riotous mob) has been defined in the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) in Section 141 as “An assembly of five or more persons, where the common object of the persons composing that assembly is committing violence or where such assembly of five or more persons is likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace”.

How exactly the legal power of the police to use force, vested in Section 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”), is to be used was prescribed in the case of Karam Singh v. Hardayal Singh And Ors. It was held that before any force can be used, three prerequisites are to be satisfied. Firstly, there should be an unlawful assembly. Secondly, such assembly is ordered to be dispersed, and thirdly, in spite of such orders to disperse, the assembly should have refused to disperse. Thus, the police can never have any excuse for not acting or waiting for orders from their superiors or the political executive.

It is a popular misconception that the police need an order from a magistrate in order to act. Section 129 of the CrPC speaks of ‘Any executive magistrate or officer in charge of a police station or, in the absence of such officer in charge, any police officer, not below the rank of a sub-inspector’. This means that any one of them can order the use of force to disperse an unlawful assembly. One often finds police officers taking a plea that while they wanted to use force, the executive magistrate did not issue orders even though the law does not say that only an executive magistrate can issue such an order. If there is an executive magistrate around, it is generally considered good practice to obtain her or his orders, but it is not stated anywhere that it is mandatory.

When the executive magistrate did not pick up Inspector Ishmeet’s call, he decided to take matters into his own hands. He shouted again at Mouli’s group, telling them to disperse. This time, Mouli and his group got scared, and ran away in different directions. Inspector Ishmeet was, however, very keen to catch them, and he then ordered his team to start firing at them. Did he have the authority to do so under S. 129 of the CrPC?